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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—“HAD ANYTHING BEEN WRONG,
WE SHOULD CERTAINLY HAVE HEARD”1: THE ANONYMOUS JURY
IN AMERICA
INTRODUCTION
On the morning of June 30, 2003, Trovon Ross knocked on the
door of Annie Christensen, his ex-girlfriend.2 Annie answered the
door and let Trovon into the front room.3 Annie then called James
May, her current boyfriend, from the bedroom.4 Trovon ques
tioned Annie about James.5 When Annie was unresponsive,
Trovon pulled a gun from his waistband and put the questions to
her again.6 Annie asked the distraught Trovon to leave. But
Trovon was not finished.7 He turned his inquiry to James, who was
equally unresponsive.8
There are four things that will make any one of us step over the
line: love, fear, ambition, and money.9 That morning, love got the
best of Trovon Ross. He grabbed Annie, pointed the gun at her,
and pushed her into the bedroom.10
James feared the worst and tried to intervene. He warned
Trovon that if he went missing the Air Force would come looking
for him.11 Seeing that Trovon was unmoved by this appeal, James
fled. He ran to the garage and got into his car.12 From inside the
house he heard three gunshots.13 He tried to start his car but could
not without blowing into a breathalyzer ignition interlock device,
and his breathing was too panicked for the device to work.14
1. W.H. AUDEN, The Unknown Citizen (To JS/07/M/378 This Marble Monument
is Erected by the State), in COLLECTED POEMS 252 (Edward Mendelson ed., Vintage
Int’l 1991) (1939).
2. State v. Ross, 174 P.3d 628, 630 (Utah 2007).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. ROBERT PENN WARREN, ALL THE KING’S MEN 205 (1946).
10. Ross, 174 P.3d at 630.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
215
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Moments later, Trovon entered the garage.15 James threw the
keys out of the car and ran down the street on foot.16 He did not
make it very far before Trovon fired six shots at him.17 The second
of these went through his right arm and into his chest.18 A passing
motorist stopped to help James and phoned the police.19 By this
time, several neighbors had also called the police and directed the
officers to Trovon’s white van.20 Several police cars attempted to
stop the van, but Trovon would not pull over.21 Finally, he was cor
nered in a cul-de-sac.22 A brief foot chase followed, but the officers
arrested him at last.23
In November 2004, the State of Utah tried Trovon for the ag
gravated murder of Annie Christensen, the attempted aggravated
murder of James May, and failure to obey a police officer’s signal to
stop.24 The trial judge, concerned about publicity and media atten
tion surrounding the case, empaneled an anonymous jury “to pro
tect the identity and privacy of the jurors[ ] and to protect jurors,
witnesses, and parties from unnecessary commotion, confusion, or
influence.”25 Thus protected, the jury convicted Trovon on all
charges.26 The judge sentenced him to three concurrent prison
terms–life without parole, five years to life, and zero to five years.27
This Note will examine the Ross court’s application of estab
lished anonymous jury jurisprudence. Empaneling an anonymous
jury is an extreme but sometimes necessary step that courts must
take during the criminal trials of certain defendants.28 When the
established guidelines for empanelment are properly applied,
judges can protect the jury’s essential elements from the potentially
devastating influence of defendant misconduct and the disruption
of procedure that attends extraordinary media coverage. But if
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 631.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1192 (2d Cir. 1991); United
States v. Gambino, 809 F. Supp. 1061, 1064-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); State v. Ferguson, 729
N.W.2d 604, 609 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007).
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there is no defendant misconduct, or if the only threat to procedure
is from the media, empaneling an anonymous jury is unwarranted,
beyond the scope of the judge’s discretion, and is itself an impair
ment of the jury’s essential elements.
The first section of this Note will review the history of the jury
in England and its adoption by the American colonies. The pur
pose of this review is to provide a context and background for mod
ern Sixth Amendment jurisprudence and for Justice White’s
important articulation of the jury’s essential elements in Williams v.
Florida.29 This section will then consider the use of anonymous ju
ries in federal district courts and their introduction and use in state
courts. Two lines of cases will be considered: the Barnes-Paccione 30
line of cases, which established the circumstances under which an
anonymous jury may be empaneled, and the Press-Enterprise 31
cases, which outlined the relationship between the constitutional re
quirement for a public trial in the Sixth Amendment and the right
of the press and public to open access at trial in the First
Amendment.32
The second section will consider how the anonymous jury doc
trine fits into established Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. This
analysis will specifically suggest that the guidelines for empaneling
anonymous juries, as established in the Barnes-Paccione line of
cases, achieve legitimacy by securing the essential elements of the
jury articulated in Williams v. Florida.33 But because the BarnesPaccione guidelines protect different aspects of these interests in
very particular ways, courts cannot haphazardly apply them. A
unique calculus ought to be considered when circumstances of the
trial do not meet all of the guidelines. The last part of this section
will argue that the Ross case, in which only two of the five guide
lines were met, is a startling example of miscalculation in applying
the Barnes-Paccione guidelines. This Note will conclude with the
suggestion that state courts should be more rigid in their application
of these factors when the temptation to empanel an anonymous
jury arises.
29. 399 U.S. 78, 86-103 (1970).
30. Paccione, 949 F.2d at 1192; United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 134-43 (2d
Cir. 1979).
31. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 7-14 (1986) (Press-Enter
prise II); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510-13 (1984) (PressEnterprise I).
32. See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 7.
33. Williams, 399 U.S. at 86-103.
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JURY

A. The Significance of the Jury
A jury, in simple terms, is a group of people “taken from the
community at large, summoned to find the truth of disputed facts,
who are quite distinct from the judges or court.”34 Juries serve on
particular occasions and then recede back into the community once
their task is complete.35 Given the jury’s transient and temporary
nature and the fact that it is composed of twelve people of average
intelligence, the marvel of the system is that the technicality and
complexity of the law, however great, will “not affect [the jury’s]
fitness to decide on the effect of proofs.”36
But the jury is more than a utilitarian marvel. It is as well a
political institution, one that is “as extreme a consequence of the
doctrine of the sovereignty of the people as universal suffrage.”37
“It is to trial by jury,” according to Lord Russell, “more than even
by representation . . . that the people own the share they have in the
government of the country.”38 Alexis de Tocqueville celebrated the
Anglo-American jury as “[a] judicial institution which has thus
commanded the approval of a great nation over centuries and has
been copied enthusiastically in every stage of civilization, in every
climate and under every form of government.”39 From its mysteri
ous beginnings, the jury earned its legitimacy not as an efficient de
cision maker but as a protector of individual rights.
B. The Development of the Jury in England
The jury as we know it seems to have had its beginnings as an
innovation of Henry II.40 Henry consolidated the English legal sys
34. WILLIAM FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 7 (Lawbook Exchange 1994)
(1894).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 9.
37. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 317, 318 (Gerald E.
Bevan trans., Penguin Books 2003) (1835).
38. FORSYTH, supra note 34, at 358 (quoting JOHN RUSSELL, AN ESSAY ON THE
HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT AND CONSTITUTION, FROM THE REIGN OF
HENRY VII, TO THE PRESENT TIME 199 (1821), available at http://www.archive.org/
stream/essayonhistoryof00russ/essayonhistoryof00russ_djvu.txt).
39. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 37, at 317.
40. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW & REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WEST
ERN LEGAL TRADITION 448 (1983); see THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORD
ING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY 1200
1800, at 9-13 (1985).
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tem by imposing royal law upon all criminal and civil matters.41
Specifically, he combined the inquest by witness with the issuance
of judicial writs.42 Writs, in Henry’s time, were royal commands
ordering a lord to settle a land dispute or ordering the sheriff to
convene the hundred.43 Henry’s writs set forth a narrow factual
test, put the questions of fact before a sworn inquest of neighbors,
and established royal jurisdiction over the proceedings.44 The con
solidation succeeded because it provided “a more rational type of
law and . . . enlist[ed] community participation in administering
it.”45 But it would be a mistake to suppose that the communal na
ture of Henry’s innovation had to do with anything except calcu
lated Norman efficiency; Henry’s object was “to compel people to
inform on one another.”46 Despite the king’s tyrannical motive,
community participation almost certainly lent a popular legitimacy
to the enterprise.47 And circumstances were such that jurors and
the accused were known to one another.48 The persistence of these
inquests into modern times is a testament to their popular appeal,
for these panels were essentially the forerunners of grand juries.49
Along with trial by ordeal in 1215, the other ancient methods
of trial—battle and compurgation—eventually fell off.50 In their
41. BERMAN, supra note 40, at 445-46.
42. Id. at 448.
43. Id. at 447. The “hundred” is an administrative division of an English county.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 809 (9th ed. 2009). Hundreds, in former times, had their
own courts. Id.
44. BERMAN, supra note 40, at 448; GREEN, supra note 40, at 10.
45. BERMAN, supra note 40, at 445-46; see also GREEN, supra note 40, at 10.
46. BERMAN, supra note 40, at 451.
47. See GREEN, supra note 40, at 20 (“The power of the jury may have reflected
more than its institutional setting and role: it may have reflected a social understanding
about the appropriate circumstances under which a person’s life might be surrendered
to the Crown.”).
48. See FORSYTH, supra note 34, at 165-66; GREEN, supra note 40, at 10.
49. BERMAN, supra note 40, at 451; NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 24 (2007). Panels of this sort were not Henry’s innovation.
BERMAN, supra note 40, at 448. Rather, Henry made these panels arms of the king’s
administration. Id.
50. FORSYTH, supra note 34, at 165. There were four methods of proof used to
settle disputes in England prior to the jury trial: “trial by wager of battle, trial by ordeal,
compurgation, and trial by witnesses.” VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 49, at 21. In the
trial by battle, the parties would swear to their version of the facts, and each would offer
to prove his side by battle or by hiring a champion to do battle for him. MAXIMUS
LESSER, HISTORY OF THE JURY SYSTEM 91 (William S. Hein & Co. 1992) (1894). The
loser would be severely punished for swearing falsely. Id. Trial by ordeal was also
called judicium dei, a procedure that overlapped with religious ritual. See id. at 81;
VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 49, at 22. There were various methods of ordeal. The
accused, for example, might be bound hand and foot and thrown in a lake. Id. If she
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place arose a tribunal similar to the inquest that had brought the
accusation.51 This new panel retained the neighbors, who likely
knew all the circumstances of the case.52 By the reign of Edward
III (1327), the jury that indicted and the jury that tried facts were
two separate bodies.53 The idea behind the separation seems to
have been to afford the accused a fair outcome.54 As the trial by
ordeal fell away, there was no other supernatural test to which the
accused could appeal.55 The judges maintained the fiction that the
accused must therefore “choose” to accept the verdict of his neigh
bors.56 The second jury, different from the one that indicted, made
the trial fairer and so encouraged the defendant’s consent.57 A fa
miliar form of the jury system was thus in place by the middle of the
fourteenth century.58

sank, she was innocent; if she floated, she was guilty. Id. Floaters were retrieved from
the lake and branded or executed. Id. Alternatively, she might be made to carry a hot
iron so many feet. Id. The blister was then examined after several days. A clean blister
meant innocence—a festering one guilt. Id. By 1215, Pope Innocent III had seen
enough. Id. at 23. The Fourth Lateran Council forbade priests from participating in the
ordeal, and it soon fell away in England. BERMAN, supra note 40, at 251; VIDMAR &
HANS, supra note 49, at 23. Compurgation was “essentially a test of good character.”
VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 49, at 23. This method of proof required the accused to
round up a certain number of people (usually twelve) to swear regarding her good
character. Finally, trial by witnesses was similar to compurgation except that the wit
nesses testified to facts rather than to character. BERMAN, supra note 40, at 448; VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 49, at 23.
51. See generally FORSYTH, supra note 34, at 165-72.
52. Id. at 172.
53. Id. at 170. A statute of the time declared: “[N]o indictor shall be put in in
quests upon deliverance of the indictees of felonies or trespass, if he be challenged for
such cause by him who is indicted.” Id. (quoting 25 Edw. 3, c. 3 (Eng.)).
54. See FREDERIC W. MAITLAND & FRANCIS C. MONTAGUE, A SKETCH OF EN
GLISH LEGAL HISTORY 59-60 (James F. Colby ed., 1915).
55. Id. at 59.
56. Id. The notion of a choice is illusory, but it demonstrates certain niceties of
the medieval mind that, were it not for the often tragic results, would be almost comical.
Trial by ordeal was understood to be an ancient privilege—the defendant’s opportunity
to invoke the judgment of God. Id. at 60. But even after the trial by ordeal was no
longer available, the notion persisted that the accused did not have to submit to a trial
by mere men. Id. at 60-61. Therefore, if the accused did not agree to a jury trial, he was
subjected to the peine forte et dure. Id. at 60. By this innovation, the accused was laid
out naked on the dungeon floor, and heaping weights were placed upon him until he
agreed to accept the verdict of his neighbors. Id.
57. Id.
58. FORSYTH, supra note 34, at 170; LESSER, supra note 50, at 148.
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Once the jury was established, king and subject alike recog
nized its advantages and frequently exploited them.59 This reality
was not lost on the Framers of the United States Constitution.60
C. The Development of the Jury in America
1. Colonial and Revolutionary Era Juries
The jury system was present in the American Colonies long
before the foundation of the United States.61 The colonists under
stood and admired the principles of jury trial, and a fierce desire to
protect rights established by this system lay at the very foundation
of the United States.62 These sentiments can clearly be seen in the
colonists’ response to England’s passage of the hated trade and rev
enue laws in the 1760s and 1770s.63 A resolution of the Stamp Act
Congress of 1765 proclaimed “[t]hat trial by jury is the inherent and
invaluable right of every British subject in these colonies.”64 En
glish customs officials recognized that “provincial juries” would not
cooperate in enforcing these regulations, and Parliament responded
by giving jurisdiction over these cases to judges without juries.65
Parliament’s interference with the colonists’ jury rights led to in
creasing hostility against England.66 It is no surprise, therefore,
that once the egg was hatched, the Declaration of Independence
criticized George III for having “combined with others, to subject
us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitutions, and unacknowl
edged by our laws; giving his Assent to their Acts of pretended Leg
islation: . . . For depriving us, in many cases, of the benefit of Trial
by Jury.”67
The language of the Constitution likewise demonstrates that
the Framers wished to preserve the jury as a fundamental institu
59. See generally GREEN, supra note 40, at 28-64; VIDMAR & HANS, supra note
49, at 27-39.
60. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-52 (1968); VIDMAR & HANS,
supra note 49, at 47-54.
61. LESSER, supra note 50, at 151; see VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 49, at 47. The
Virginia Company’s charter provided for jury trial in 1606; New Plymouth and the Mas
sachusetts Bay Colony recognized trials by jury in 1623 and 1628 respectively; and jury
trial was available in Rhode Island as early as 1647, prior to its formal establishment as
a colony. Id.
62. See VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 49, at 51, 52-54.
63. RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 24 (2003).
64. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 152 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
65. JONAKAIT, supra note 63, at 24; VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 49, at 51-52.
66. JONAKAIT, supra note 63, at 24.
67. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 15, 20 (U.S. 1776); see also
LESSER, supra note 50, at 151.
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tion of justice for the new nation.68 Article III declares that “[t]he
Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury.”69 Furthermore, such a trial
must be “speedy and public,” and the jury both “impartial” and “of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed.”70
But it was not until the 1960s and 1970s that the finer contours
of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury were marked out by case
law. In these decisions, the Supreme Court questioned how much
of the common-law jury the Founders wished to preserve in the text
of Article III and the Sixth Amendment.71 These cases considered
whether, for example, a jury’s verdict must be unanimous72 and
whether a jury of less than twelve was constitutional.73 The Su
preme Court addressed this last question in 1970 in Williams v.
Florida.74
In Williams, the Court reviewed the “very scanty history” of
the provision for jury trials in Article III and the slightly less scanty
history of the Sixth Amendment.75 During the drafting of the Bill
of Rights, there was some concern that Article III had left out “the
common-law right to be tried by a ‘jury of the vicinage.’”76 James
Madison introduced a version of the Amendment in the House of
Representatives that stated, “The trials of all crimes . . . shall be by
an impartial jury of freeholders of the vicinage, with the requisite of
68. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; id. amends. VI, VII.
69. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
70. Id. amend. VI.
71. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406
U.S. 404, 409-10 (1972); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 93-94 (1970); Baldwin v. New
York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-54 (1968); Singer v.
United States, 380 U.S. 24, 31 (1965).
72. See Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 404.
73. Williams, 399 U.S. at 86-103.
74. See id.
75. Id. at 93-94 (quoting Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty Federal
Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917, 969
(1926)) (internal quotation marks omitted). There is a great deal of scholarship ad
dressing the broad historical question of how far the Founders wished to go (i.e., how
radical or conservative they were) with respect to the Constitution and the English
system of law they sought to overthrow. For some interesting histories on this subject,
see generally RICHARD HOFSTEDLER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION (1948);
DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, ALBION’S SEED (1989); GORDON S. WOOD, RADICALISM &
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1991). All of these, to some extent, consider the general
revolutionary pattern suggested by Mr. Berman. See BERMAN, supra note 40, at 19.
76. Williams, 399 U.S. at 93 (quoting F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 31-33,
93 (1951)); see also 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *359 (“[B]y the policy of
the ancient law, the jury was to come de vicineto, from the neighborhood of the vill or
place where the cause of action was laid in the declaration.”).
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unanimity for conviction, of the right to challenge, and other accus
tomed requisites . . . .”77 This version passed the House with little
change.78 But the Senate debated the matter for over a week and
returned a significantly altered Amendment to the House.79 One of
the main objections in the Senate was the vicinage requirement.80
In many of the states, juries were selected from the state at large or
from very large districts rather than from the counties.81 Enacting
the vicinage requirement would have created administrative hard
ships for those states that drew juries from large areas.82 The Sen
ate also opposed the House’s version of the Amendment because
the bill that would become the Judiciary Act of 1789 already in
cluded a vicinage requirement.83
Attempts at compromise were of little avail. It was suggested
that “with the accustomed requisites” be inserted after “Juries,” but
even that was rejected.84 And so the Amendment took on its ulti
mate form: “[T]he accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed . . . .”85
In considering the Founders’ debate over the Sixth Amend
ment, Justice White made three observations that establish a base
line for analyzing the American jury in the context of constitutional
history.86 First, “the mere reference to a ‘trial by jury’ in Article
III” was not construed by the drafters of the Sixth Amendment to
include the common-law vicinage requirement.87 If, therefore, the
predicate of relation (i.e., to the area from which jurors are drawn)
could be abandoned without violence to the Constitution, so too
could the predicate of quantity.88 One can therefore infer that
other predicates could be similarly abandoned without constitu
tional effect. Secondly, “provisions that would have explicitly tied
77. Williams, 399 U.S. at 94 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435 (1789)).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 95.
81. Id. at 95 n.39 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton
(Sept. 14, 1789), in 1 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITING OF JAMES MADISON 491 (1865)).
82. Id. at 95 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, supra
note 81) (internal quotation marks omitted).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 95-96.
85. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
86. Williams, 399 U.S. at 96-97.
87. Id. at 96.
88. Recall that the issue in Williams was whether the defendant could be constitu
tionally tried by a jury of less than twelve. Id. at 79.

R
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the ‘jury’ concept to the ‘accustomed requisites [of common law ju
ries]’ of the time were eliminated.”89 And thirdly, “where Congress
wanted to leave no doubt that it was incorporating existing com
mon-law features of the jury system, it knew how to use express
language to that effect.”90 From these observations Justice White
concluded, “[T]here is absolutely no indication in the ‘intent of the
Framers’ of an explicit decision to equate the constitutional and
common-law characteristics of the jury.”91
But the Court’s decision in Williams does not strip away the
common-law protections that go beyond the letter of Article III and
the Sixth Amendment. The Court noted that
[t]he purpose of the jury trial . . . is to prevent oppression by the
Government. . . . Given this purpose, the essential feature of a
jury obviously lies in the interposition between the accused and
his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen,
and in the community participation and shared responsibility that
results from that group’s determination of guilt or innocence.92

Thus, sometimes the Constitution demands more than the
common-law jury provided for (for example, the requirement that a
jury represent a fair cross section of the community),93 and other
times less (for example, that a jury need not decide a case by unani
mous vote).94 However, two “essential feature[s]” of the jury must
remain: The jury must continue to interpose between the accused
and his accuser “the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen,”
and the jury must reflect “the community participation and shared
responsibility that results from [its] determination of guilt or inno
cence.”95 Everything else appears to be fair game. It can be ar
gued, therefore, that Williams opened the door for federal district
courts to empanel anonymous juries in the late 1970s.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
MENT IN

Id. at 96-97.
Id. at 97.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 100.
See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526-28 (1975).
See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 412 (1972).
Williams, 399 U.S. at 100; see also ALFREDO GARCIA, THE SIXTH AMEND
MODERN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE 183 (1992).
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2. History of Anonymous Jury Jurisprudence
a. The Barnes-Paccione line of cases lays the groundwork
The first anonymous jury in American history was empaneled
in 1977.96 United States v. Barnes was an organized-crime trial in
the Southern District of New York.97 Leroy “Nicky” Barnes was
tried with fourteen codefendants on counts of conspiracy, violations
of federal narcotics laws, and possession of weapons.98 One of the
Government’s witnesses for the trial was Robert Geronimo.99
Before the trial, the United States Marshals, who had custody of
Geronimo, received a phone call during which the caller said, “[i]f
he [Geronimo] does anything, he’ll be dead.”100 Right before the
trial began, another alleged Barnes associate, Shepard Franklin, ac
tually did turn up dead.101 The Government moved to sequester
the jury for their safety.102 The trial judge went a step further and
“prohibited the disclosure of the names, addresses, and religious
and ethnic backgrounds of potential jurors.”103 In fact, neither the
prosecutor nor defense counsel were able to learn what neighbor
hood the jurors lived in; rather, they could only inquire as to a “ju
ror’s county of residence.”104
Two things are worth noting about the manner by which the
anonymous empaneling played out. First, neither of the parties re
quested an anonymous jury; it was done, rather, as a “judicial
fluke.”105 When counsel pressed the trial judge for an explanation,
he responded, “I think jurors are entitled to their privacy and I
think their families are entitled to their privacy.”106 Secondly, the
trial judge stymied litigation of the issue at trial level.107 The U.S.
Attorney said nothing when the trial judge announced the anony
mous empaneling at a pretrial conference, and the judge rejected
96. Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Anonymous Juries: In Exi
gent Circumstances Only, 13 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 457, 457 (1999).
97. United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979); Abramovsky, supra note
96, at 457, 460.
98. Barnes, 604 F.2d at 130; Abramovsky, supra note 96, at 460.
99. Abramovsky, supra note 96, at 461.
100. Barnes, 604 F.2d at 136 (internal quotation marks omitted).
101. Abramovsky, supra note 96, at 461.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 458.
106. United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 168 (2d Cir. 1979).
107. Abramovsky, supra note 96, at 461.
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out of hand the defense’s numerous objections.108 And so, the
court empaneled the first fully anonymous jury in the United States
without the guidance of prior case law or the participation of the
parties.109 Even so, the Second Circuit approved the trial judge’s
decision, finding that “[t]here is neither statutory nor constitutional
law that requires disclosure of information about jurors unrelated
to any issue as to which prejudices may prevent an impartial
verdict.”110
After the Second Circuit’s decision in Barnes, anonymous ju
ries were used mostly in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New
York111 and primarily for organized-crime cases.112 But it did not
take long for courts in other districts to get into the act,113 and the
federal courts of appeals developed a stable set of rules to guide
lower courts.114 These rules were articulated in their entirety for
the first time in United States v. Paccione.115 An anonymous jury
could be empaneled if (1) there is a compelling reason to believe
that the jury needs protection from outside sources, and (2) reason
able precautions are taken to protect the jury’s impartiality and the
defendant’s fundamental rights.116 Within this framework, it is in
the discretion of the trial judge whether or not to allow an anony
mous jury.117 Compelling reasons, under the first heading, could
include (1) the involvement of the defendant in organized crime;
(2) the participation of the defendant in a group that has the ability
to harm jurors; (3) past attempts by the defendant to interfere with
the judicial process; (4) the degree of punishment the accused faces
if convicted; and (5) extensive media coverage and exposure of the
jurors to harassment by journalists.118
108. Barnes, 604 F.2d at 169.
109. Abramovsky, supra note 96, at 461.
110. Barnes, 604 F.2d at 143.
111. Abramovsky, supra note 96, at 458.
112. Id. at 464. “Although the Second Circuit has held that ‘the invocation of the
words “organized crime,” “mob,” or “mafia,” without something more, do not warrant
use of an anonymous jury,’ the federal courts have in practice concluded that ‘some
thing more’ is present in virtually every organized crime case.” Id. (citations omitted).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507 (8th Cir. 1995); United States
v. Edmond, 52 F.3d 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507 (11th Cir.
1994); United States v. Crockett, 979 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1992).
114. See United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1192 (2d Cir. 1991).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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Soon, the issue took hold in the states. In Ohio, a court of
appeals overturned a murder conviction because the Fairfield
County Court of Common Pleas had empaneled an anonymous jury
according to its regular rules of procedure.119 But the Ohio Su
preme Court reversed on the ground that the use of an anonymous
jury did not amount to structural error and did not violate a funda
mental constitutional right.120
In Minnesota, following a series of sensational trials for the
murder of a police officer, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld
the empaneling of anonymous juries in three of the defendants’ tri
als.121 Following the lead of other state courts, the Minnesota Su
preme Court used the federal courts’ two-prong test to determine
that the empaneling was proper.122
But not all state courts embraced the idea. In the Massachu
setts case of Commonwealth v. Angiulo, the Supreme Judicial Court
ruled that a trial court empaneling an anonymous jury failed to fol
low a Massachusetts statute,123 which provides, “A prisoner in
dicted for a crime punishable with death or imprisonment for life,
upon demand by him or his counsel upon the clerk, shall have a list
of the jurors who have been returned . . . .”124 This failure
amounted to plain error.125 The court explained that “[t]he em
panelment of an anonymous jury triggers due process scrutiny be
cause this practice is likely to taint the jurors’ opinion of the
defendant, thereby burdening the presumption of innocence.”126
Five years later, in Commonwealth v. Dupont, the Superior Court
of Massachusetts granted a defendant a new trial after an improp
erly empaneled anonymous jury convicted.127 While not foreclos
119. State v. Hill, 737 N.E.2d 577, 581-83 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000), rev’d, 749 N.E.2d
274 (Ohio 2001).
120. Hill, 749 N.E.2d at 281-82.
121. See generally State v. Bowles, 530 N.W.2d 521 (Minn. 1995); Jodene Jensen,
Case Note, Constitutional Law: Minnesota’s First Anonymous Jury, 22 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 133 (1996).
122. Bowles, 530 N.W.2d at 530-31; see also Major v. State, 873 N.E.2d 1120, 1127
(Ind. Ct. App. 2007); State v. Ferguson, 729 N.W.2d 604, 611 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007);
State v. Ivy, 188 S.W.3d 132, 144 (Tenn. 2006).
123. Commonwealth v. Angiulo, 615 N.E.2d 155, 174 (Mass. 1993).
124. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 277, § 66 (2008); see also Angiulo, 615 N.E.2d at 168
69. There is a similar statute in the U.S. Code, 18 U.S.C. § 3432, which states, “A per
son charged with treason or other capital offense shall . . . be furnished with a . . . list of
the veniremen . . . stating the place of abode of each venireman . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3432
(2006); see also Angiulo, 615 N.E.2d at 169 n.18 (citing § 3432).
125. Angiulo, 615 N.E.2d at 170.
126. Id. at 171 (citation omitted).
127. Commonwealth v. Dupont, 9 Mass. L. Rptr. 1, 17 (Super. Ct. 1998).
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ing the possibility of anonymous juries in Massachusetts, the court
concluded that there had been “no good reason” for empaneling
one.128 Dupont posed no threat to juror safety, and neither the
prosecution nor the charges in the indictments suggested any need
to protect the jury from improper influence.129
In sum, although the introduction of the procedure in the fed
eral district courts was anomalous at the time, the circuit courts of
appeals quickly formulated a set of clear standards by which lower
courts could empanel anonymous juries without doing violence to a
defendant’s constitutional rights. To be sure, there was a considera
ble amount of litigation on the matter over the next twenty years.
But in most cases the lower courts followed the standards faithfully,
and the circuit courts of appeals were satisfied with the results.130
Such has been the case, in large part, in state courts as well.131
When a legitimate need for an anonymous jury arose, the BarnesPaccione standards proved a practical and workable way to allow
judges to protect jurors’ safety and integrity. But then during the
eighties the Supreme Court decided two cases that limited judges’
discretion under the aegis of Barnes-Paccione.
b. The Press-Enterprise decisions consider anonymous juries
from a First Amendment perspective
Several years after the Barnes case was decided, a California
Superior Court judge closed the voir dire examination of prospec
tive jurors for a rape-murder trial.132 When Press-Enterprise Com
pany moved for the proceedings to be opened, the trial judge
permitted Press-Enterprise “to attend only the general voir dire,”
128. Id. at 7.
129. Id. at 11.
130. See, e.g., United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507 (8th Cir. 1995); United States
v. Edmond, 52 F.3d 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507 (11th Cir.
1994); United States v. Crockett, 979 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1992).
131. See, e.g., State v. Ferguson, 729 N.W.2d 604, 611-12 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007)
(holding that mere allegations that the defendant, a gang member and murder suspect,
had harassed a witness were sufficient for court to conclude that jury needed protec
tion); State v. Ivy, 188 S.W.3d 132, 144 (Tenn. 2006) (holding that trial court did not
abuse its discretion in empaneling an anonymous jury by inferring that the nature of the
defendant’s crime (the murder of a witness) was sufficient to warrant protecting the
jury). But see State v. Hill, 749 N.E.2d 274, 281 (Ohio 2001) (recognizing Paccione
standard but refusing to find that failure to meet it amounts to structural error); Nancy
J. King, Nameless Justice: The Case for the Routine Use of Anonymous Juries in Crimi
nal Trials, 49 VAND. L. REV. 123, 131-32 (1996) (citing temporary policies of routine
empanelment of anonymous juries in Los Angeles and Riverside Counties, California).
132. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 503 (1984).

\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-1\WNE106.txt

2010]

unknown

Seq: 15

4-MAY-10

THE ANONYMOUS JURY IN AMERICA

15:56

229

which amounted to a mere three days out of the six weeks of voir
dire proceedings.133 The remaining six weeks of voir dire were con
ducted behind closed doors.134 Following voir dire, Press-Enter
prise moved to have the trial court release the complete transcript
of the proceeding. Counsel on both sides argued against the release
of the transcript, stating that the release would be a violation of the
jurors’ right of privacy.135 The trial judge agreed.136 Press-Enter
prise again sought release of the transcript after the accused had
been convicted and sentenced to death, and the judge again denied
access, citing the jurors’ right to privacy.137
But the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s ruling.138 Af
ter reviewing the history of the jury in both England and Colonial
America, Chief Justice Burger concluded that “[p]ublic jury selec
tion . . . was the common practice in America when the Constitu
tion was adopted.”139 He went on to draw a distinction (which he
admitted was hardly necessary) between the “right” to openness
that attaches as between the defendant and the public and openness
“as a component inherent in the system benefitting both.”140 He
loosely characterized this openness as “the right of everyone in the
community.”141
The value of openness lies in the fact that people not actually
attending trials can have confidence that standards of fairness are
being observed; the sure knowledge that anyone is free to attend
gives assurance that established procedures are being followed
and that deviations will become known. Openness thus enhances
both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of
fairness so essential to public confidence in the system.142

Because of this essential quality of the jury system, the Court stated
that
[t]he circumstances under which the press and public can be
barred from a criminal trial are limited . . . . Where . . . the State
attempts to deny the right of access in order to inhibit the disclo
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 504.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 505.
Id. at 508.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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sure of sensitive information, it must be shown that the denial is
necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is nar
rowly tailored to serve that interest.143

The openness of which Chief Justice Burger spoke does not
amount merely to competing or overlapping rights between the ac
cused and the public. Chief Justice Burger took considerable
trouble to explain the inherent functional value of openness to the
system because it ensures that citizens can be, in a general sense,
confident both in their system of justice and in the accused’s access
to due process.144 “[O]penness has,” he explained, a “community
therapeutic value” insofar as it serves “a community urge to retali
ate and desire to have justice done.”145 More importantly, “public
proceedings vindicate the concerns of the victims and the commu
nity in knowing that offenders are being brought to account for
their criminal conduct by jurors fairly and openly selected.”146
Openness is a quality so inherent to the proceedings that its ab
sence invokes the strictest level of judicial scrutiny: “Closed pro
ceedings . . . must be rare and only for cause shown that outweighs
the value of openness.”147
Chief Justice Burger emphasized this inherent quality of open
ness at trial and its value to the defendant even more explicitly in
Press-Enterprise II.148 In that case, the trial court restricted the
press’s access to the preliminary hearing of a murder trial.149 The
State and Press-Enterprise moved for the release of the preliminary
hearing’s transcript, and the defendant, a nurse charged with the
murder of twelve hospital patients, opposed its release on the
ground that it “would result in prejudicial pretrial publicity.”150
Writing again for the Court, Chief Justice Burger reaffirmed PressEnterprise I and again emphasized that criminal proceedings are
presumptively open.151 He noted, in even stronger terms than
those of Press-Enterprise I, that “[t]he right to an open public trial
is a shared right of the accused and the public, the common concern
143. Id. at 509-10 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596,
606-07 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted).
144. Id. at 508.
145. Id. at 508-09.
146. Id. at 509 (emphasis added).
147. Id.
148. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
149. Id. at 5.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 8.
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being the assurance of fairness.”152 Further, he asserted that “the
explicit Sixth Amendment right of the accused is no less protective
of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment right of the
press and public.”153 So fundamental is the right of both accused
and public to an open trial that the “risk of prejudice does not auto
matically justify refusing public access to hearings on every motion
[by the accused] to suppress” and “any limitation must be ‘narrowly
tailored to serve that interest.’”154 The public nature of the trial
cannot be easily foreclosed even when doing so is in the interest of
the accused.
The Press Enterprise cases, although dealing primarily with the
First Amendment right of the press to information concerning trial
procedures, are significant when considered alongside the BarnesPaccione jurisprudence because the Press-Enterprise cases demon
strate that there are two very different ways of litigating claims to
the inherent rights of the public and the accused to an open trial.155
Although the Press-Enterprise cases have developed independently
from the Barnes-Paccione line of cases, the former demonstrate the
contours of First and Sixth Amendment rights as between defen
dant, jury, and public.156 The particulars of State v. Ross suggest
that courts must have a clear perception of these contours before
empaneling an anonymous jury under the Barnes-Paccione
guidelines.157
3. State v. Ross Revisited
Trovon Ross appealed his murder conviction to the Utah Su
preme Court in 2007, arguing that the trial court committed plain
error by empaneling an anonymous jury.158 The court disagreed,
holding that “[j]udges properly enjoy considerable latitude in con
ducting the affairs of their courtroom so long as courtroom proce
dures do not communicate bias against the defendant.”159 The
court found that the lower court had “adhered closely to the princi
152. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
153. Id. (quoting Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
154. Id. at 15 (quoting Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)).
155. See generally Babak A. Rastgoufard, Pay Attention to That Green Curtain:
Anonymity and the Courts, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1009, 1012-14 (2003).
156. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 7; Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 508-09; see
Rastgoufard, supra note 155, at 1014.
157. State v. Ross, 174 P.3d 628, 637 (Utah 2007).
158. Id. at 636.
159. Id. at 637.
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ples reflected in [the] guidelines [of the Barnes-Paccione stan
dard].”160 The court further found that the lower court was justified
in its finding because Ross’s crime “featured an embittered exlover, a gruesome killing, a suspenseful escape, a police chase, and
an abundance of other elements that made the trial an irresistible
media event.”161 But nothing in the record demonstrates that the
jurors’ privacy or safety was ever actually in peril.162
The result in Ross brings up the question of whether the trial
court’s empaneling of an anonymous jury went too far. The
Barnes-Paccione standards developed as guidelines for trial judges
to use with the exercise of discretion for the purpose of controlling
their courtrooms.163 The standards were formulated to protect the
rights of the accused and the integrity of the jury system in the face
of extreme circumstances, when the proceedings or the jurors them
selves had been threatened with either violence or corruption.164
But the Ross court did not use the Barnes-Paccione guidelines to
protect jury integrity in the face of an articulated threat; rather, it
used them to ward off the speculative threat of a press frenzy.165 In
focusing on the Barnes-Paccione guidelines and ignoring the lessons
of the Press-Enterprise cases, the Ross court compromised the in
tegrity of the jury and very likely violated the due process rights of
Trovon Ross.
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Scholarship Surrounding the Issue of Anonymous Juries
1. The Extremes
The scholarly response to the growing use of anonymous juries
has been limited and extreme.166 Professors Abramovsky and Ed
elstein and Professor King inhabit the issue’s polar regions. Profes
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See id. at 630-31, 637.
163. See United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1192-93 (2d Cir. 1991).
164. See id.
165. Ross, 174 P.3d at 637.
166. See generally Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 96 (outlining various reasons anonymous juries violate the rights of the accused); King, supra note 131; Kory A.
Langhofer, Unaccountable at the Founding: The Originalist Case for Anonymous Juries,
115 YALE L.J. 1823 (2006); Marc O. Litt, “Citizen-Soldiers” or Anonymous Justice: Rec
onciling the Sixth Amendment Right of the Accused, the First Amendment Right of the
Media and the Privacy Right of Jurors, 25 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 371 (1992);
Rastgoufard, supra note 155 (considering whether anonymity can coexist with the presumed openness of the court system).
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sor King argues that the main evils of anonymity—impairment of a
defendant’s presumption of innocence and right to an impartial
jury—can be eliminated by making anonymity routine.167 Ano
nymity’s advantages, according to King, include enhancing the reli
ability of voir dire,168 improving the quality of the jury’s
deliberations,169 protecting jurors from intimidation during trial,170
and promoting jury service.171 Furthermore, King asserts that ju
rors should not be held accountable for the verdicts they render, so
that “enlist[ing] the individual consciences of jurors” need not go so
far as to join jurors’ consciences to names.172
Professors Abramovsky and Edelstein argue against ever em
paneling an anonymous jury.173 Anonymity, their argument goes,
not only fails to serve the purpose of protecting jurors from threats
of danger and from corruption,174 it also impairs the presumption of
innocence,175 threatens judicial integrity,176 and disrupts the ability
of counsel to investigate jurors for bias.177 Further, anonymity rep
resents an “[e]rosion of the ‘tradition of identified jurors,’” which
reaches back to Colonial times.178
In short, Professors Abramovsky and Edelstein question, in
the broadest terms, whether or not anonymous juries should exist at
all. Conversely, the arguments of Professor King question why
anonymous juries should not always exist in every circumstance.
This general approach is worthwhile scholarship, but it is of little
help at present. Anonymous juries are a confirmed part of the
American legal landscape at both the federal and state level. But
they remain the exception rather than the rule. And judges that
elect to empanel anonymous juries need more particular guidance
when treading on the ground of exception.

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

See King, supra note 131, at 145-47.
Id. at 136-37.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 139.
Id. at 140-41; see also Langhofer, supra note 166.
See generally Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 96.
See id. at 466-67.
Id. at 468-72.
Id. at 472-76.
Id. at 476-81.
Id. at 481.
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2. A Practical Approach to Anonymous Juries
The purpose of this Note is not to dispute the arguments in
favor of or against anonymous juries. In some respects, time has
dulled their edge anyway. Anonymous juries empaneled under the
Barnes-Paccione guidelines have a thirty-year history in American
jurisprudence.179 The Supreme Court appears to be in no hurry to
invalidate them.180 At the other end of the argument, courts’ resort
to these guidelines suggests that we are no closer to the routine
anonymity sought by Professor King than we were when she pro
posed the idea twelve years ago.181
In short, the Barnes-Paccione guidelines work. Their legiti
macy has been upheld again and again, by court after court.182
They allow judges to protect the jury’s essential elements from de
fendant misconduct and overzealous media activity, and, more im
portantly, they are in accord with the essential factors articulated in
Williams.183
Judges ought, therefore, to approach the Barnes-Paccione
guidelines with the Williams factors in mind. If there is no threat of
interference from defendant misconduct, or if the threat is only
from the media (i.e., the fifth guideline), empaneling an anonymous
jury is unwarranted, beyond the scope of the judge’s discretion, and
an impairment of the essential elements of the jury. The Ross court
acted beyond the scope of discretion allowed by the Barnes-Pacc
ione jurisprudence because it failed to consider the implications of
these guidelines within the context of Sixth Amendment jurispru
dence. The particular calculus for applying the Barnes-Paccione
guidelines becomes clear when considered within the Sixth Amend
ment framework of Williams v. Florida.184
B. The Significance of Williams v. Florida
Recall that the question presented in Williams was, in the
broadest sense, whether “every feature of the jury as it existed at
common law—whether incidental or essential to that institution—
179. United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979).
180. Id. at 458; Rastgoufard, supra note 155, at 1012.
181. King, supra note 131, at 124.
182. See, e.g., State v. Samonte, 928 P.2d 1, 14 (Haw. 1996); State v. Hill, 749
N.E.2d 274, 281 (Ohio 2001); State v. Ferguson, 729 N.W.2d 604, 611 (Minn. Ct. App.
2007) (using a variation of the Barnes-Paccione guidelines); State v. Ivy, 188 S.W.3d
132, 144 (Tenn. 2006).
183. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 96-103 (1970).
184. Id.
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was necessarily included in the Constitution wherever that docu
ment referred to a ‘jury.’”185 After considering the history of Arti
cle III and the Sixth Amendment, Justice White concluded that
“there is absolutely no indication in the ‘intent of the Framers’ of
an explicit decision to equate the constitutional and common-law
characteristics of the jury.”186
But recall also that the Court’s decision in Williams does not
strip away the common-law protections that go beyond the letter of
Article III and the Sixth Amendment.187 There are, according to
Justice White, two essential features of a jury: “the interposition
between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment
of a group of laymen, and . . . the community participation and
shared responsibility that results from [the jury’s] determination of
guilt or innocence.”188 The first of these features is primarily legal,
the other primarily cultural. First, as a legal institution, the jury acts
as a safeguard of individual rights.189 This function is “legal” in the
sense that it corresponds with and extends the checks-and-balances
structure of the federal system as created and secured by the
United States Constitution.190 Secondly, the jury “provides a vital
link between the law and the community.”191 This quality is harder
to identify, but acceptance of this premise is an important part of
American jurisprudence.192 A jury’s legitimacy rests upon “the
community participation and shared responsibility that result[ ]
from [its] determination of guilt or innocence.”193 The lesson to
take from Williams is that a jury can be modified without constitu
tional effect to the extent that the modification does not impair
185. Id. at 91. The immediate question in Williams was whether a jury of less
than twelve impaired a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at 86.
186. Id. at 99.
187. Id. at 100.
188. Id.
189. Id. (“The purpose of the jury trial . . . is to prevent oppression by the Gov
ernment . . . .”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968) (“A right to jury trial
is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the Government.”);
ALFREDO GARCIA, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN MODERN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
183 (1992).
190. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156.
191. GARCIA, supra note 189, at 183; see also Williams, 399 U.S. at 100; DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 37, at 319 (“[T]he jury is above all a political institution; it must
be considered as one form of the sovereignty of the people; it has to be entirely rejected
were the sovereignty of the people discarded; otherwise it should be made to harmonize
with those other laws which establish sovereignty.”).
192. See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 37, at 319 (“Laws are always unsteady
when unsupported by custom[,] which is the only tough and lasting power in a nation.”).
193. See Williams, 399 U.S. at 100.
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these two essential functions. The Barnes-Paccione guidelines as
sume these essential functions and recognize that legitimate threats
to them warrant the extreme step of empaneling an anonymous
jury.
C. The Barnes-Paccione Guidelines in the Context of Williams
Recall that, under the Barnes-Paccione guidelines, a court
should not empanel an anonymous jury unless (1) there is a strong
reason to believe that the jury needs protection, and (2) the court
takes reasonable precautions to make sure that the defendant is not
prejudiced by the anonymous empaneling.194 There is sufficient
reason to protect the jury by this step when (1) the defendant has a
connection to organized crime; (2) the defendant has the means and
capacity to harm jurors; (3) the defendant has attempted to inter
fere with the judicial process in the past; (4) the defendant is facing
a lengthy incarceration or heavy fine; and (5) there has been exten
sive pre-trial publicity in the matter.195 This section will explore
how the above guidelines correspond with the two essential ele
ments of a jury identified by Justice White in Williams.196 Four of
these five reasons identify how the Williams elements may be im
paired either by the misconduct of the defendant or by the behavior
of the press.197 A judge may resort to an anonymous jury only after
the essential elements of the jury have been threatened or im
paired.198 Juror anonymity is thus a last resort—rather than a cas
ual option—taken to protect the jury from threats to its most
inherent qualities.
1. The Defendant’s Involvement with Organized Crime
Recall that anonymous juries were most often used in organ
ized crime trials in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New
York.199 In 1964, fifteen years before Barnes, Judge Friendly re
flected the judicial system’s frustration in dealing with organized
crime when, after confirmed threats were made against jurors, he
194. United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1192 (2d Cir. 1991).
195. Id. at 1192-93.
196. Williams, 399 U.S. at 78.
197. The fourth guideline is of no significance to this discussion. All of the cases
in which an anonymous jury is at issue are serious cases with severe penalties. See
United States v. Mohammed, 538 F. Supp. 2d 281, 285-86 (D.D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding
that the possibility of a lengthy incarceration is alone insufficient to justify empaneling
an anonymous jury).
198. See Paccione, 949 F.2d at 1192.
199. Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 96, at 458.
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anticipated the need for anonymous juries in United States v. Bo
relli.200 In spite of case law warning that the mere connection to an
organized crime syndicate is not enough to empanel an anonymous
jury,201 in practice, association with organized crime is all that is
necessary for a judge to grant a request for anonymous
empaneling.202
But this practice is quite proper. A defendant’s involvement
with organized crime is at odds with the jury’s essential function of
interposing the commonsense judgment of a group of lay people to
protect the defendant from the power and resources of the govern
ment.203 The Barnes-Paccione doctrine developed as a result of
countless attempts by defendants to circumvent judicial process
with the resources of organized crime.204 A defendant who uses
such resources has, in effect, spurned the legal protection offered to
her by the jury and by the other legal institutions society provides
for the protection of its citizens. While association with organized
crime does not mean that a defendant loses all of her rights, it is
legitimate for a judge to balance the propriety of empaneling a
traditional public jury for the purpose of protecting the defendant’s
due process rights with the need to protect the jury’s safety.
2. The Defendant’s Participation in a Group with the
Capacity to Harm Jurors
Like the first guideline, this guideline assumes that the defen
dant relies on a group or corporate entity that is antithetical to the
protective organizations of the legal system and is willing to corrupt
those institutions by threat or force. The second guideline is identi
cal to the first in its recognition of the need to secure the jury’s
function as a protective corporate barrier between government and
defendant from conduct by the defendant or her associates that re
gards the jury’s protective function with contempt.205 But this
guideline also assumes that the defendant has put herself more ex
plicitly at odds with the second Williams element, namely, the jury’s
role as a communal institution of participatory democracy.206 The
200.

336 F.2d 376, 392 (2d Cir. 1964); Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 96, at

R

463.
201.
202.
Gambino,
203.
204.
205.
206.

United States v. Vario, 943 F.2d 236, 241 (2d Cir. 1991).
Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 96, at 464; see also United States v.
809 F. Supp. 1061, 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
See supra text accompanying notes 96-118.
Williams, 399 U.S. at 100.
Id.
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jury’s verdict is a legitimate exercise of power because of its “re
publican character,” which “entrusts the actual control of society
into the hands of the ruled, or some of them, rather than into those
of the rulers.”207 A defendant’s involvement with a group that has
the capacity to harm jurors mocks the very element that makes the
jury a legitimate exercise of power. An institution designed to pro
tect citizens from public tyranny ought not to suffer an attack from
private tyranny. This guideline is, then, also a legitimate considera
tion for a court because a defendant who endangers this particular
quality of the jury’s essence relinquishes some claim to the protec
tion that the quality secures.
3. The Defendant’s Attempts to Interfere with Judicial
Process or Witnesses
Like the first two guidelines, this requirement responds to con
duct by the defendant that is out of joint with the basic premises
upon which the Williams guidelines are based. The first Williams
element assumes “[t]he insolence of office.”208 A jury would not be
necessary as an interposition between government and accused un
less the accused needed protection from the government, even the
arm of the government that is responsible for administering justice.
Therefore, a defendant who attempts to interfere with judicial pro
cess by way of corrupting witnesses or jurors is essentially colluding
with the very system that the jury is supposed to guard against.
This third guideline allows for a judicial response to protect the in
tegrity of the jury from such collusion when the defendant has
demonstrated contempt or disregard for the organs of justice that
shield her from the corruption of the government.
4. The Potential for Lengthy Incarceration or Heavy Fine
This guideline has little (if anything) to do with the essential
elements of the jury. Furthermore, it could never stand by itself as
a reason to empanel an anonymous jury. Its presence among the
five guidelines is important only insofar as it ensures that the crime
involved is of sufficient severity to warrant the extreme step of
anonymity.209
207. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 37, at 318.
208. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 1.
209. See supra note 197.
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5. Extensive Media Attention That Would Expose Jurors to
Harassment or Intimidation
Before considering the fifth guideline, two comments are in or
der on the first four. First, the circumstances anticipated by these
guidelines clearly reflect the Barnes-Paccione doctrine’s organizedcrime heritage.210 In some respects, these guidelines represent the
very heart of the doctrine, for they respond most directly to the
disruptive circumstances faced by jurors in those early cases.211
Secondly, the circumstances anticipated by the first four guidelines
are all more or less things within the defendant’s control. In this
respect, the first four guidelines put the defendant on a sort of no
tice. If she involves herself with organized crime or attempts to cor
rupt justice, she may end up facing an anonymous jury.
The circumstances anticipated by the fifth guideline clearly im
plicate both of Williams’s essential elements. A press frenzy carries
with it the risk of disrupting the commonsense judgment of the ju
rors,212 and it discourages citizens from serving on juries at all.213
In this respect, therefore, this guideline reflects the doctrine’s at
tempt to protect the jury’s most essential qualities.
But the fifth guideline is quite distinct from the other four.
Unlike the others, the threshold circumstances for the fifth guide
line are almost always beyond the control of the defendant. Since a
defendant has little control over the behavior of the press, the “tit
for-tat” rationale that grounds the other guidelines in the conduct
of the defendant is entirely absent here. Furthermore, unlike the
novelty that attended the circumstances giving rise to the first four
guidelines, the tension between the fair administration of justice
and the chaos that often attends public trials has been long recog
nized by the courts.214 Standing by itself, media chaos should not
be a reason for departing from the norm. To this end, the Ross case
is significant because the only determinative factor that the court

210. See United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1192 (2d Cir. 1991); United
States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 141 (2d Cir. 1979).
211. See United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 392 (2d Cir. 1964).
212. See King, supra note 131, at 137-38.
213. Id. at 126-30.
214. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 4 (1986); Press-Enterprise I, 464
U.S. 501, 509-10 (1984); Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 547-54 (1976); Shep
pard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 349-52 (1966); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 373-76
(1947).
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cited in empaneling the anonymous jury was speculation about a
media frenzy.215
D. The Ross Case
As the Ross court points out, judicial discretion is a hallmark
of anonymous jury jurisprudence.216 “Judges properly enjoy con
siderable latitude in conducting the affairs of their courtroom so
long as courtroom procedures do not communicate bias against the
defendant.”217 But most courts, recognizing this discretion, also
note that the decision to empanel an anonymous jury is “an ex
treme measure.”218 And the decision usually attends extraordinary
circumstances such as gang-related violence or offenses against jus
tice implicated in the first four guidelines.219
But in Ross there were no such extraordinary circumstances.220
Although Ross carried off his crime in a sensational way, neither
the crime nor anything in the record suggested that Ross himself
was any more of a danger to the jury’s safety than any other angry
ex-lover settling a score.221 The trial court’s decision to allow the
empaneling of an anonymous jury rested entirely on “the threat of
extensive publicity about the case” and a “desire to protect the ju
rors’ privacy.”222
The Utah court’s rationale is particularly troublesome when
considered under the light of the Press-Enterprise line of cases.
While Press-Enterprise does not set the standard that ought to be
215. State v. Ross, 174 P.3d 628, 637 (Utah 2007).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Major v. State, 873 N.E.2d 1120, 1126 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); see, e.g., State v.
Brown, 118 P.3d 1273, 1281 (Kan. 2005) (referring to the withholding of jurors’ names
as “unusual”); Commonwealth v. Angiulo, 615 N.E.2d 155, 171 (Mass. 1993) (“The due
process clause precludes the empanelment of an anonymous jury at a criminal trial
unless anonymity is necessary to protect the jurors from harm or improper influence.”);
State v. Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378, 387 (Minn. 2007) (stressing that an anonymous jury
should only be empaneled in “rare and exceptional circumstances”).
219. See, e.g., Wren, 738 N.W.2d at 386 (holding that the court properly em
paneled an anonymous jury because the offense involved gang membership and retalia
tory shooting); State v. Ferguson, 729 N.W.2d 604, 611-12 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007)
(finding anonymous empanelment proper because there was “strong reason . . . to be
lieve the jury needed protection from external threats” from gang members); State v.
Ivy, 188 S.W.3d 132, 144-45 (Tenn. 2006) (holding that the trial court properly em
paneled an anonymous jury on the ground that the defendant had committed murder to
prevent the victim from going to the police).
220. See State v. Ross, 174 P.3d 628, 630-31, 637 (Utah 2007).
221. See id.
222. Id. at 637.
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followed when empaneling an anonymous jury,223 it does articulate
the contours of the constitutional rights involved as between juror
and defendant so that the essential elements of the jury, as defined
in Williams, are preserved.
The Press-Enterprise line of cases makes clear that, with re
spect to any “‘right’ to openness as between the accused and the
public,” a distinction “is not crucial,”224 and “the [r]ight to an open
public trial is a shared right of the accused and the public, the com
mon concern being the assurance of fairness.”225 Most notably,
Press-Enterprise II asserts that the Sixth Amendment right to a
public trial “is no less protective of the open nature of the trial than
the First Amendment right of the press and public.”226
When there is a media frenzy of such degree that a juror’s right
to privacy is violated, the Press-Enterprise doctrine does not con
sider the media’s conduct such a threat to or betrayal of process
that it warrants restricting the presumed openness of the trial on
the strength of the judge’s discretion alone.227 Rather, when media
scrutiny invades a juror’s right of privacy, Press-Enterprise I re
quires the judge to “seal only such parts of the transcript as neces
sary to preserve the anonymity of the individuals sought to be
protected.”228 But the purpose of sealing the transcript on such oc
casions would be to protect a particular juror from embarrassment
when answering voir dire questions rather than to protect every ju
ror from the general inconvenience of media scrutiny.229 Under
this line of cases, “[t]he presumption of openness [in judicial pro
ceedings] may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on
findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”230 If there is a juror pri
vacy interest at issue, the burden falls on the juror to show, for ex
ample, that voir dire questions pose a unique encroachment upon
that interest.231
223. But see Rastgoufard, supra note 155, at 1018-20.
224. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984) (“No right ranks higher than the
right of the accused to a fair trial. But the primacy of the accused’s right is difficult to
separate from the right of everyone in the community to attend the voir dire which
promotes fairness.”).
225. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 7 (1986).
226. Id. (quoting Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984)); see also Rastgoufard,
supra note 155, at 1013-14.
227. See generally Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1; Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501.
228. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 513.
229. See id. at 512.
230. Id. at 510.
231. Id. at 512.
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It is significant that the Press-Enterprise I Court put such rigid
restrictions on a trial judge’s ability to close proceedings. The re
quirement that any such closure be narrowly tailored to protect the
privacy of a particular juror reflects the Court’s reluctance to allow
broad, across-the-board closures. By keeping most of the proce
dures open, the Court maintains the jury as an institution that al
lows the open participation of the community in the judicial
process. In other words, it maintains the jury according to the es
sential elements set out in Williams.232
The Press-Enterprise cases thus have a very significant effect
on the Barnes-Paccione doctrine when it comes to a case like Ross.
Press-Enterprise teaches that the Sixth Amendment right to a “pub
lic trial, by an impartial jury”233 is no less important than the First
Amendment right the Court sought to protect by requiring trial
judges to narrowly tailor their restrictions on access to jurors.234 If
the object of the Barnes-Paccione guidelines is to secure the essen
tial elements of the jury; and if the specific object of the fifth guide
line is to prevent the media from impairing either of the Williams
elements; that object, when the fifth guideline is the only guideline
in play, must be subject to a standard similar to that of Press-Enter
prise. In a case like Ross, therefore, where the defendant was not
associated with organized crime, did not have the capacity to harm
jurors, and had no history of interfering with judicial process, the
jury was no more vulnerable than it would have been in any other
case in which there was intense media scrutiny. In such a case, the
trial judge ought not to have the discretion to empanel an anony
mous jury (or close any aspect of the trial) unless something more is
present.
CONCLUSION
The most important legal consideration of this Note is the in
consistency between the Barnes-Paccione jurisprudence and the
Press-Enterprise jurisprudence in addressing juror anonymity. In
strictly legal terms, this inconsistency ought to be rectified, or at
least more fully explained by the courts.
232. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
233. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
234. See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1986) (requiring “specific, on the
record findings . . . demonstrating that ‘closure is essential to preserve higher values and
is narrowly tailored to serve that interest’” (quoting Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at
510)); see also Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 501.
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In terms of cultural considerations, the idea that media corpo
rations, with the vast resources that attend such enterprises, should
have additional advantages and a stronger claim on the presump
tion of openness than the accused, who is frequently disadvantaged
in terms of resources, friends, sympathy, and even (perhaps because
of the vastness of the media corporations’ resources) the very pre
sumption of innocence that our Constitution demands, seems pre
posterous but not surprising.
For this reason and others legal professionals must preserve
the institutions of their trade. This is not to say that these institu
tions should not evolve and progress. Preserving institutions does
not mean bunkering them so that they no longer serve their pur
pose. But it does mean establishing contours of identity that are
more or less rigid, especially in the face of the worst vices of mod
ern existence—apathy, timidity, and intellectual and ethical sloth.
The arguments in this Note therefore assume that it is not
enough to say that a jury is successful if it completes its task and
reaches an appropriate verdict. “[T]he community participation
and shared responsibility that results from that group’s determina
tion of guilt or innocence”235 must also be present. The jury not
only comes to a decision, it also ratifies the work of the members of
the bar who tried the case and the judge who heard it, of the elected
officials who passed the substantive laws at issue and the governing
procedural rules, and of the centuries of public servants and advo
cates who have eked out the rule of law by increments and scraps
from the grip of tyranny and arrogance. Casually turning such a
decision over to mere “consciences”236 operating from hidden iden
tities betrays this communal responsibility.
Brian Clifford*

235. Williams, 399 U.S. at 100.
236. King, supra note 131, at 141.
* I dedicate this Note to my parents.
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